Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Qualia, philosophy: qualia are the sensory-like correspondences to properties perceived on external objects or processes. Problems arise in connection with the explanation of their origin and their comparability between individuals. See also phenomena, sensory perception, sensations, perceptions, stimuli, qualities, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, objectivity, inverted spectra, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ned Block on Qualia - Dictionary of Arguments
Chalmers I 250 Qualia/absent qualia/Block/BlockVsChalmers/BlockVsInvariance Principle/Chalmers: (Block 1978)(1): Block thesis: in the case of identical biochemical realization in a non-human system, the Qualia, which accompany the conscious experience in humans, must be missing. E.g. suppose the corresponding organization had been realized in a country, instead of in an organism: This country can certainly have no conscious experiences. Invariance principle/Chalmers: it follows from this that, in the case of an identical biochemical organization, conscious experiences are possible in a system. 1. Ned Block 1978. Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27